We document that credit spreads are positively related to two types of executory contracts: noncancellable operating leases and unconditional purchase obligations. However, while leases and purchase obligations receive the same treatment by the Bankruptcy Code and current …nancial reporting rules, the credit spread impact per unit of leverage from purchase obligations is substantially less than that from leases. We conjecture that the e¤ect of executory contracts on credit spreads depends on how essential the underlying assets or services are for the functioning of a bankrupt …rm as a going concern. Essential contracts are likely to be unconditionally assumed by bankruptcy trustees, thus representing potentially higher post-default losses for holders of unsecured debt. Our …ndings potentially inform accounting standards that propose recognizing …rms'operating lease obligations in …nancial statements while continuing to require solely footnoted disclosure of purchase obligations.
Introduction
We examine how …rms'credit spreads in the Credit Default Swap (CDS) market are associated with two types of executory contracts, noncancellable operating leases and unconditional purchase obligations. 1 We hypothesize that both types of contracts increase credit spreads on unsecured debt because they potentially represent senior, though o¤-balance sheet, obligations. That is, in case of bankruptcy a …rm's o¤-balance sheet monetary commitments to counterparties in operating leases and purchase obligations potentially trump its commitments to unsecured debt holders. Our null hypothesis is that the credit spread impact of the two types of executory contracts is identical, given that both types of contracts (i) give rise to obligations that are e¤ectively secured by related assets (operating leases) or by goods and services (purchase obligations) 2 , (ii) typically exclude provisions found in debt contracts under which a default would accelerate repayment or involuntary bankruptcy, (iii) receive similar treatment under the Bankruptcy Code, (iv) require similar disclosures under current …nancial reporting rules, and (v) are measured identically in our analysis. 3 Our paper speaks to the question raised by Barth (2006, p.122) : Should equal and o¤setting rights and obligations from executory contracts be recognized in the balance sheet? This question is subject to debate among standard setters and users and producers of accounting information. This debate is consequential because the amounts of future cash ‡ows committed under executory contracts such as purchase obligations and operating leases is substantial.
Our panel regressions of CDS spreads on leverage measures reveal that credit spreads are indeed positively associated with both leases and purchase obligations. However, we …nd that the e¤ect of operating leases on spreads is substantially larger than the e¤ect of purchase obligations. On average, with the mean CDS spread of 60 basis points as the baseline, a 10-percentage point increase in leverage due to an increase in the present value of operating 1 An executory contract is one under which one or more parties has not yet completely ful…lled its obligations. 2 A lessor's assets under lease are secured because the lessor retains title to the asset. A supplier's assets associated with a customer's purchase obligations are secured because the goods or services are still owned and controlled by the supplier (delivery has not occurred). 3 Other research also shows that operating leases a¤ect credit risk assessments (e.g., Kraft 2011 , Batta et al. 2011 , Altamuro et al. 2011 , Lim et al. 2006 ). Ours however is the only paper documenting the e¤ect of purchase obligations on credit spreads, and comparing the price e¤ects of purchase obligations and operating leases, two types of executory contracts.
leases raises spreads by 18 basis points. This impact is identical to that of a corresponding increase in balance sheet debt. In contrast, a 10-percentage point increase in leverage due to an increase in the present value of purchase obligations raises spreads by only 6 basis points.
We conjecture that the impact of leases and purchase obligations on credit spreads depends on the degree to which, on average, these executory contracts are perceived by credit market participants to be critical -i.e. essential -for the functioning of a bankrupt …rm as a going
concern. An obligation's essentiality matters because of the Bankruptcy Code's speci…c treatment of leases and purchase obligations. Depending on the circumstances, leases and purchase obligations can be e¤ectively senior or e¤ectively junior to unsecured debt. Section 365 of the Code, titled Executory contracts and unexpired leases, grants the debtor's estate the option to assume or to reject any lease or purchase obligation (Fried, 1996) . The business judgment standard is used to evaluate whether a contract is assumed or rejected by the estate, and little consideration is given to the e¤ect the decision has on the counterparty (Andrew, 1988 (Andrew, , 1991 . 4 Thus, in Chapter 11 reorganization, if the bankruptcy estate deems that a contract is "essential" to the post-bankruptcy performance of the …rm, it is more likely to assume the contract.
Assumed leases or purchase obligations are e¤ectively senior to unsecured debt because (i) any default that may have already occurred in the assumed contract must be "cured", (ii) the original terms of the contract must be performed in full, and (iii) the debtor's estate (as opposed to the debtor itself) becomes bound to the contract. 5 In essence, the original obligations of assumed contracts become liabilities of the debtor's estate. 6 On the other hand, rejected leases or purchase obligations are e¤ectively junior to existing unsecured debt because the injured party has less bargaining power than unsecured debt holders since (i) 4 Under the "automatic stay"provided by the bankruptcy law, the non-debtor party to an executory contract must continue to perform during the bankruptcy proceeding while the assumption/rejection decision is made (Russell,2011 .) 5 Legal literature explaining that assumed executory contracts are considered senior to unsecured creditors includes, for example, Andrew (1988 Andrew ( , 1991 , Ayer (2003 Ayer ( , 2004a , Fried (1996) , and Maizel (2002) . 6 "[Understanding] that the estate and the debtor are distinct legal entities -is crucial to understanding executory contracts doctrine. One important consequence of the distinction between the debtor and the estate is that the debtor's creditors, like the bene…ciaries of an ordinary trust, are not in any direct sense creditors of the bankruptcy estate. They merely have a right, ultimately, to a distributive share of the estate, although that right is referred to as a 'claim.' The estate will, however, have its own creditors, for expenses incurred in the process of administration. Their claims, called 'administrative'claims, have priority over the claims of the debtor's unsecured creditors to distributive shares of the estate" (Andrew 1998, 852) . they must sue for damages yet to be established, (ii) such damages are typically not easily veri…able in court, and (iii) litigation costs are typically high. 7 The perceived essentiality of the underlying asset or goods and services re ‡ects the likelihood that the corresponding lease or purchase obligation would be assumed or rejected by the debtor's estate, and therefore whether it would be e¤ectively senior or e¤ectively junior to unsecured debt in bankruptcy. Estate trustees are likely to assume an essential individual lease or purchase obligation even if its terms become individually onerous or unfavorable to the debtor because rejection would e¤ectively shut down the business as a going concern.
In other words, an essential executory contract (lease or purchase obligation) is likely to be unconditionally assumed by a debtors'estate. 8 By a¤ecting the debtor estate's decision to assume or reject, an obligation's essentiality a¤ects the loss given default for unsecured debt holders. A higher essentiality implies a higher perceived likelihood of assumption regardless of contractual terms, thus higher perceived likelihood of seniority vis-à-vis unsecured debt, and therefore a higher expected loss given default for unsecured creditors. Therefore, ex ante, greater essentiality implies a higher credit spread, all else equal. The higher price impact of leases relative to purchase obligations that we …nd is consistent with leased assets being perceived, on average, as more likely to be deemed essential for the functioning of a bankrupt …rm as a going concern, than are purchase obligations.
To further motivate our conjecture, we examine several recent bankruptcy …lings by publicly traded US …rms and their estate's assumption/rejection decisions regarding the debtor's existing executory contracts. Appendix A details each case. Our analysis of these …lings suggests that the essentiality of an obligation seems to be the predominant reason determining whether an executory contract is assumed or rejected by a debtor's estate. Leases and purchase obligations that are deemed critical to the debtor's operations are assumed and 7 If the estate does not assume an obligation, the debtor is not liable for performance on the executory contract and the creditor's claims for damages, after established in court, are treated as other unsecured claims (Andrew,1988) . 8 As Hahn (2011, page 730) notes: "Executory contracts may be extremely important to an insolvent company. Often the continuation of certain contracts will be the basis for the entire business operations of the debtor. . . . As a practical matter, the continuation of the contract is critical because the costs and time entailed in negotiating and entering into an alternative contract might be signi…cant. In these circumstances, entering into an alternative contract is an impracticable solution for the debtor, in view of its penurious situation. A debtor which becomes insolvent lacks two things: time and liquid funds. Any action required to keep its business alive which consumes these two resources, is doomed to failure." those that are not are rejected. For example, Reddy Ice Holdings, Inc., in their bankruptcy …ling, …led a motion to assume a master lease for equipment used in its ice manufacturing lines and stated in their motion (italics added):
"The Debtors wish to assume the Master Equipment Lease Agreement because the Leased Equipment is essential to the Debtors'e¤orts to successfully restructure. The Leased Equipment, which is utilized in more than eighty (80) third party locations as well as several Debtor-operated facilities, signi…cantly reduces the manufacturing, distribution and delivery costs associated with the Debtors' products and is integral to the Debtors'operations."
Our bankruptcy case analyses also suggest that operating leases are more often assumed than are purchase obligations. For instance, following their bankruptcy …ling, Kodak's and Citadel Broadcasting Corporation's purchase obligations declined by more than their corresponding operating leases. Kodak's purchase obligations declined 57% ($717 million to $310 million) while its operating leases declined by only 17% ($292 million to $241 million); Citadel Broadcasting Corporation's purchase obligations decreased 19% ($334 million to $271 million) while its operating leases decreased by only 9% ($131 million to $119 million).
Similarly, in bankruptcy Bally Total Fitness assumed 330 leases while rejecting 70, whereas it assumed only 10 while rejecting 540 purchase contracts. In the bankruptcy …lings that we examined, debtors-in-possession appear more likely to a¢ rmatively assume (and provide details about) lease contracts than about other executory contracts. According to US Bankruptcy Code, any executory contract not a¢ rmatively assumed by a debtor's estate is deemed to be rejected and is not the debtor estate's liability (Andrew, 1988) . Thus, the relative paucity of information pertaining to the a¢ rmative assumption/rejection of purchase obligations is perhaps additionally suggestive of debtor estates more frequently rejecting such executory contracts.
Further empirical tests support our conjecture that credit market's perceptions regarding the essentiality of executory contracts for the functioning of a going concern in ‡uence their impact on the cost of unsecured debt capital. We obtain individual 10-K disclosures about the nature of …rms'purchase obligations, and manually classify our sample …rms depending on how essential the underlying goods and services are for the functioning of a bankrupt …rm as a going concern. We code each …rm's purchase obligations as belonging to one of three groups; high, moderate and low essentiality. For example, Hershey's obligations to purchase raw materials (cocoa, corn syrup, milk, sugar etc.) from speci…c suppliers at pre-determined prices are classi…ed as having low essentially, and thus likely to be rejected by its debtor's estate if their terms are unfavorable for the going-concern, since these raw materials are commodities traded in large spot markets served by many di¤erent suppliers.
In contrast, Verizon Communications'obligations to purchase network services, equipment, and software are classi…ed as having high essentiality, and thus are likely to be assumed by bankruptcy trustees and paid in full even if their terms become individually onerous or unfavorable to the bankrupt debtor. Verizon's debtors-in-possession are likely to assume these contracts regardless of their terms because these are fundamental intermediate inputs for their business, and are likely to be provided by specialized suppliers, and thus less likely to be replaceable. Consistent with our conjecture, our results show that the credit market price e¤ect of a purchase obligation depends on its assessed degree of essentiality. We …nd that the credit spread e¤ect per unit of leverage associated with purchase obligations is statistically equal to the price e¤ect of leases when the degree of essentiality of purchase obligations is high, and statistically equal to zero when the degree of essentiality is low.
The credit spread e¤ect for the group with moderate essentiality (or missing information) is nonzero and similar to the full sample average price e¤ect of purchase obligations.
We consider alternative explanations for our empirical results. First, distressed …rms are potentially more likely to lease assets and are less likely to have purchase obligations since their vendors may be unwilling to enter into purchase contracts. Consequently, high CDS spreads due to distress may lead to greater leasing and lower purchase obligations; i.e. reverse causation. However, we …nd that the di¤erential e¤ect on CDS spreads of operating leases and purchase obligations is more pronounced in the sub-sample of investment grade …rms (i.e. non-distressed) relative to speculative grade …rms (i.e. distressed). Thus, reverse causality is an unlikely explanation for our …ndings. Second, leases and purchase obligations potentially have di¤erential information content about a …rm's future cash ‡ows. We examine this explanation by incorporating controls for information content in our research design as the disclosure requirements of the two types of obligations are similar. Our tests show that the di¤erential information content of purchase obligations and operating leases does not explain their di¤erential price impact. Third, the existence of leases and purchase obligations may a¤ect a company's risk pro…le. However, the risk impact would explain our …ndings only if the risk impact of leases and purchase obligations di¤ers. We incorporate controls for risk in our research design, and given the similarity of the impact on the probability of bankruptcy and the similarity of the economic function of leases and purchase obligations (both of which hedge expected asset requirements), we are able to reject this explanation.
The contribution of this paper is twofold. First, ours is the …rst and so far only paper documenting the valuation of disclosed data on purchase obligations for debt investors. We put forth and validate an economic conjecture explaining why the price e¤ect of purchase obligations is on average smaller than that of operating leases, a similarly computed and disclosed corporate obligation. By showing that an accounting disclosure is useful for debt investors, this paper contributes to the growing …nance and accounting literature on credit risk pricing.
Second, we believe our paper belongs to the subset of valuation papers that can potentially inform standard setting, as it speaks to the debate of whether rights and obligations from executory contracts should be recognized in the balance sheet. There are con ‡icting views.
Currently, debt and capital leases are recognized as liabilities, whereas operating leases and purchase obligations are disclosed in …nancial statement footnotes, and, since 2004, additionally disclosed in the MD&A section of …nancial …lings. The Financial Accounting Standards Board's (FASB 2013) newly-proposed leasing standard will require …rms to recognize substantially all obligations and related assets for leases longer than one year on the balance sheet, whereas purchase obligations will remain o¤-balance sheet. Several organizations have criticized both the initial and revised leasing exposure drafts (FASB 2013b). Criticism ranges from the leasing industry plea for the status quo to the CFA Institute recommendation that both purchase obligations and leases should be fully recognized. To wit, in its invited comments to the FASB and IASB's initial exposure draft, Ernst and Young (2010) notes:
"The Boards should articulate a clear conceptual basis for the di¤erentiation between leases and other non-lease executory contracts. Without a clear articulation of the Boards'rationale for a¤ording such drastically di¤erent accounting to leases, we struggle to understand the principles that led the Boards to their decisions."
In contrast to the current FASB proposal, and seemingly supporting the notion that leases and purchase obligations should be treated equally with respect to recognition versus disclosure, the Bankruptcy Code treats both types of corporate obligations similarly. As previously discussed, Section 365 of the Code grants the debtor's estate the option to assume or to reject any executory contract or unexpired lease of the debtor. The law provides the bankruptcy trustee with the same option to accept or to walk away from leases or purchase obligations; however, the trustee's decision will relate to the essentiality to the …rm of the underlying leased assets and the underlying goods and services under purchase obligations. If the underlying leased assets tend to be more critical in the functioning of the bankrupt …rm as a going concern than the underlying purchase-obligation for goods and services, the leases would tend to be more likely assumed than the purchase obligations. In turn, the greater likelihood of assumption would increase the overall credit spread e¤ect on the …rm, as discussed before. Our empirical analysis shows that, per unit of leverage, the credit spread e¤ect of leases is equal in magnitude to that of balance sheet debt, while the credit spread e¤ect of purchase obligations, though non-zero, is substantially smaller. Similar to the probability continuum concept governing recognition of contingencies, it could be argued that the di¤erential credit pricing of leases and purchase obligations re ‡ects their di¤erent economic characteristics (likelihood of assumption versus rejection in bankruptcy as we posit) which in turn could justify di¤erential accounting treatment.
Hypotheses and Empirical Speci…cations
In this section we enumerate our hypotheses and explain how our research design leads to implications about coe¢ cients on the variables in our credit spread regressions. We also elaborate on a few aspects of our research design that are particularly relevant in interpreting results from the credit risk pricing model that we use for our empirical tests.
Initial Hypotheses Tests
Our empirical examination relies on regressing 5-year Credit Default Swap (CDS) spreads on determinants of credit spreads, including measures of noncancellable operating leases and unconditional purchase obligations. As noted by Barth, Beaver, and Landsman (2001, 91), a primary research design consideration for value relevance research is the selection of the valuation model that is used in the tests. Thus, using a structural valuation model rooted in theory is an important aspect of our research design. In our empirical tests, we adopt the well established credit-risk pricing model of Davydenko and Strebulaev (2007) , which derives from Merton's (1974) seminal debt-pricing model and subsequent theoretical extensions. Davydenko and Strebulaev (2007) classify the structural determinants of credit spreads into two categories: strategic variables and non-strategic variables. The non-strategic determinants of credit spreads include the three variables in Merton (1974) : leverage, asset volatility, and risk-free rates. As we explain in detail in Section 3, we decompose leverage into three components: balance sheet debt (B/S Debt), noncancellable operating leases (Op. Leases), and unconditional purchase obligations (Purchase Obligations). These three components add up to total …rm leverage, and we focus on their relative e¤ect on credit spreads. Because we use time …xed e¤ects in our regressions, we do not include the risk-free rate as an independent variable. Our time …xed e¤ects represent a di¤erent intercept for each quarter and capture time variation in the risk-free rate as well as in other determinants of aggregate credit spreads. The fourth non-strategic variable is the log of a …rm's book value of assets. A …rm's book value of assets proxies for the quality of its information environment, and Hypothesis 3: The price e¤ects of balance sheet debt, noncancellable operating leases, and unconditional purchase obligations on credit spreads are equal:
Essentiality Conjecture
To test our conjecture regarding the relation between credit spreads and the essentiality of obligations, we examine individual …rms'10-K descriptions of their purchase obligations. We create a dummy variable, Essential, that equals 1 when the goods and services described in purchase obligations appear to be vital and irreplaceable for the functioning of the …rm as a going concern. When Essential is equal to 1, credit market participants should expect that bankruptcy trustees will assume the purchase obligations contracts even if these are otherwise individually onerous (…nancially unfavorable) for the bankrupt …rm, because rejection would lead to immediate suspension of operations and eventual liquidation. Analogously, we create a dummy variable Non-Essential that equals 1 when purchase-obligation goods and services appear non-vital or replaceable. We describe our coding of the Essential and Non-Essential dummy variables in Section 3.
In our tests, we interact the dummy variables Essential and Non-Essential with Purchase
Obligations and estimate the following regression model:
Our …nal hypothesis is:
The price e¤ect of purchase obligations is higher when purchase obligations appear to be essential and lower when purchase obligations appear non-essential: E > 0 ; N E < 0:
Conceptual clari…cations
Before proceeding to the description of our data and results, we clarify certain conceptual aspects of our research design. Because our focus is on credit risk, we use a credit spread valuation model adapted from Davydenko and Strebulaev (2007) rather than a balance sheet equity valuation model often used in the value relevance literature. These clari…cations are important because they help rule out alternative explanations for our …ndings, and cover four areas: hedging or risk-incentive e¤ects, information e¤ects, net versus gross value of contracts, and the recognition of onerous executory contracts.
Hedging or risk-incentive e¤ects. The pre-determination of future rents or prices (and quantities) implicit in operating leases and purchase obligations could potentially reduce credit spreads by reducing risk. On the other hand, Triantis (1993) argues that the speci…c treatment of executory contracts by the Bankruptcy Code creates incentives for debtors with executory contracts to take on more risk, as it grants the debtor an option to walk away from onerous or unfavorable contracts. This would imply that operating leases and purchase obligations could increase credit spreads by increasing risk. Our framework accounts for any potential risk-reducing or risk-increasing e¤ects associated with executory contracts.
As in Merton's (1974) framework, these potential bene…ts translate into lower or higher asset volatility. Consequently, we use asset volatility as a control variable in our empirical speci…cations.
Information e¤ects. Our framework accounts for the possibility that …rms enter into long term operating leases and purchase obligations when they expect high demand for their products. In our framework, any potential information content of either operating leases or purchase obligations is re ‡ected in higher current stock prices (and thus lower leverage), leading, all else equal, to lower credit spreads. Note that our explanatory variables B/S Debt, Op. Leases, and Purchase Obligations are constructed as leverage components. As we explain in detail in Section 3, the current market value of equity is used in constructing all three variables.
Net vs. gross value of contracts. In economic terms, every operating lease and purchase obligation represents both an asset and a liability. For example, to a …rst approximation, if a purchase obligation of goods and services is made at actuarially fair prices, the net value of the purchase obligation is close to zero at inception. However, over time the net value may deviate from zero. If we were pursuing a value relevance study for equity valuation using the balance sheet model, we would likely bene…t from using the net rather than (or in addition to) the gross value, as Venkatachalam (1996) does for bank derivative positions.
However, since we are using a debt valuation model (more precisely, credit spread valuation model) we focus on the future cash ‡ows committed under balance sheet debt, operating leases, or purchase obligations, not on net values. The netting out is implicit in our use of stock market equity values when de…ning the leverage components B/S Debt, Op. Leases,
and Purchase Obligations.
Recognition of onerous contracts. If a purchase obligation pertains to goods and services for which there is a veri…able market price, and if this market price has subsequently declined below the commitment price (subject to materiality thresholds), the amount of the unrealized loss must be recognized along with a corresponding on-balance sheet obligation (FASB ASC 330-10-35-17). There is a similar, albeit less general, requirement to recognize unrealized losses on operating leases that are "without economic bene…t to the entity" (FASB ASC 420-10-25-1). Note, however, that i) partially recognized purchase obligations or leases are not listed as o¤-balance sheet contractual obligations, and as such are not included in our
Purchase Obligations or Op. Leases leverage measures; ii) partially recognized purchase obligations or leases do not appear on the balance sheet as Debt (short-term or long-term), and thus are excluded from our B/S Debt leverage measure. Therefore, early recognition of onerous executory contracts (which, incidentally, is rare) does not bias our inference regarding the relative price e¤ects of B/S Debt, Op. Leases, and Purchase Obligations.
Data and Measures
Our dependent variable is the (log) spread of a …rm's 5-year credit default swap (CDS). A credit default swap is essentially a form of insurance against default by a particular …rm, known as the reference entity. The buyer of default protection makes a periodic payment to the seller of default protection, and if the reference entity defaults on its obligations, the buyer receives compensation. Speci…cally, the CDS gives a buyer the right to sell to the protection seller -at par -a bond issued by the reference entity if a credit event occurs.
CDS spreads are tied to bond spreads by an arbitrage relation (Du¢ e, 1999): the CDS spread for a …rm is equal to the di¤erence between the yield on a ‡oating-rate bond of the same maturity issued by the …rm and the risk-free rate. Therefore, similar to bond yield spreads, CDS spreads can be approximated by the probability of default times the expected loss given default. CDS spreads are particularly useful in empirical studies of credit risk pricing because they are supposedly less a¤ected by non-default components (for example, liquidity and taxes) than bond yields spreads (see Longsta¤, Mithal, and Neis (2005)).
Markit Group is our source for CDS spread data. Markit collects quotes from a large sample of CDS dealers and aggregates them into a composite number after …ltering out outliers and stale observations. Quotes are for CDS contracts using senior unsecured debt of North Note that we use quarterly data on CDS spreads even though information on purchase obligations and operating leases is released annually: the reason is that we have higher frequency data on other determinants of spreads such as balance sheet debt, total assets, and asset volatility. Therefore, using quarterly data allows us to sharpen our inference about the coe¢ cients on purchase obligations and operating leases.
COMPUSTAT is our primary source of data on noncancellable operating lease obligations. Disclosure of contractual obligations must be presented using a speci…c tabular format that shows payments due by period, with amounts due after …ve years presented as a lump sum.
We merge Markit's CDS data with CRSP/COMPUSTAT, eliminating …rms with SIC code between 6000 and 6999 or SIC code between 4900 and 4949. Firms with these SIC codes are considered …nancial …rms and utilities respectively, for which data on noncancellable operating lease obligations is not available on COMPUSTAT. We use annual COMPUSTAT data for noncancellable lease obligations (items MRC1 through MRC5, and MRCTA) and quarterly data for the other accounting variables. To ensure that the accounting data we use is available to market participants at the time of the CDS spread observation, we assume a three-month lag between …scal-quarter dates (i.e., COMPUSTAT datadates) and CDS spread dates. Our Markit/CRSP/COMPUSTAT data has 3,096 …rm-quarter observations and 388 …rms. This data is merged with purchase obligations data obtained from …rms'10-K …lings. The combined dataset has 2,864 …rm-quarter observations and 376 …rms.
Following Davydenko and Strebulaev (2007) , our estimates of asset volatility rely on data from Moody's KMV. We obtain time series of asset values from Moody's KMV, and compute historical asset return volatility over the previous six months, after removing outliers by trimming daily asset returns at the 5% level in each tail for each …rm. Outliers typically correspond to corporate events such as changes in capital structure (SEOs, stock repurchases, mergers and acquisitions etc.). We annualize asset volatilities by multiplying by the square root of 252. After merging the Markit/CRSP/COMPUSTAT/10-K data with Moody's KMV asset volatility estimates, our sample has 2,846 …rm-quarter observations and 372 …rms.
Finally, we merge our Markit/CRSP/COMPUSTAT/10-K/Moody's KMV data with the Thompson Financial Ownership database. The Financial Ownership data are used to calculate the fraction of equity owned by institutional investors, and the normalized number of institutional equity investors. We are able to match all of our observations; therefore our …nal sample still has 2,846 …rm-quarter observations and 372 …rms. 10 We discount future operating lease and purchase obligations to present value in order to make We de…ne three main leverage-related variables: B/S Debt, Op. Leases, and Purchase Obligations. These variables are subcomponents of …rm leverage. B/S Debt is the component of total leverage due to balance sheet debt obligations (including short-and long-term debt):
B=S Debt = Debt M kt: V alue of Equity + Debt + P V Leases + P V P urchase Obligations :
Note that both PV Leases and PV Purchase Obligations appear in the denominator of B/S Debt. This is because B/S Debt is the component of total leverage attributable to balance sheet debt, in the spirit of Merton's (1974) debt pricing model. Op. Leases is the component of total leverage due to noncancellable operating leases:
Op: Leases = P V Leases M kt: V alue of Equity + Debt + P V Leases + P V P urchase Obligations ;
and Purchase Obligations is the component of total leverage due to unconditional purchase obligations:
P urchase Obligations = P V P urchase Obligations M kt: V alue of Equity + Debt + P V Leases + P V P urchase Obligations :
Note that total …rm leverage is given by: B/S Debt + Op. Leases + Purchase Obligations. Table 1 summarizes our variables and data sources, and Table 2 provides summary statistics. Tables 1 and 2 Table 2, Panel A shows that the average log spread for …rms in our sample is 3.71, corresponding to a spread of 41 basis points. The average spread in the sample is 60 basis points.
The large di¤erence between mean spread and mean log spread suggests considerable skewness in spreads. In later analyses, we use Median regressions to rule out the possibility that The other correlations between explanatory variables in the same speci…cation are not excessively high, indicating that our OLS regression results are not a¤ected by multi-collinearity.
The correlation between Op. Leases and log credit spreads is 0.24, and the correlation between Purchase Obligations and log credit spreads is 0.07.
Essentiality. We examine individual …rms'10-K descriptions of their purchase obligations to create the dummy variables Essential and Non-Essential. Essential equals 1 when the goods and services described in purchase obligations appear to be vital and irreplaceable for the functioning of the …rm as a going concern. Non-Essential is equal to 1 when the goods and services appear non-vital or replaceable. If Essential equals 1, then investors should expect the purchase obligation to be unconditionally assumed by bankruptcy trustees. If
Non-Essential equals 1, then investors should expect rejection, unless the purchase obligation is favorable for the bankrupt …rm. If both Essential and Non-Essential are equal to zero, then either the purchase obligation rates moderate in terms of essentiality or information is missing. Essential is equal to 1 for 20% of our sample while Non-essential is equal to 1 for 23% of our sample.
Our coding of the Essential and Non-Essential dummy variables is premised on a few principles. First, purchase obligations related to commoditized raw materials are likely to be Non-Essential, because these raw materials can be purchased from a multiple suppliers in large spot markets. Second, purchase obligations related to capital expenditures are likely to be Non-Essential because it is unlikely that a bankrupt …rm invests in expanded physical capital in order to keep functioning as a going concern. Third, purchase obligations related to specialized intermediate inputs are likely to be Essential. Fourth, purchase obligations for retail stores are likely to be inventory (unless otherwise mentioned) and thus likely to be Essential. Fifth, when multiple purchase-obligation goods and services are mentioned without the corresponding individual dollar values, it is assumed that the earlier mentioned obligations are larger than later mentioned obligations. Appendix B provides examples of our coding of …rms'purchase obligations'essentiality. 11 
Results
In this Section we report results of empirically testing our hypotheses. In subsection 1,
we describe the results of estimating our baseline speci…cation, and performing the initial hypotheses tests. Results of robustness checks are discussed in subsection 2. Tests of our essentiality conjecture are presented in subsection 3. Column (1) reports results of regressing log CDS spreads on non-strategic variables, ignoring noncancellable operating leases and purchase obligations. For consistency, and for comparison with the extant credit pricing literature that ignores executory contracts, in Column (1) the variable B/S Debt omits PV Leases and PV Purchase Obligations from the denominator.
Initial Hypotheses Tests
Our results are similar to those of the extant literature: credit spreads are positively associated with leverage (B/S Debt) and volatility (Asset Volatility), and negatively associated with with size (Log of Assets).
In Column (2), we augment the baseline structural model by introducing both noncancellable operating leases and unconditional purchase obligations as additional explanatory variables. 12 We …nd that the coe¢ cients on both Op. Leases and Purchase Obligations are statistically signi…cant at the 1% level. We conclude that the data support our hypotheses (H1) and (H2) that credit spreads are positively associated with obligations from noncan-cellable operating leases unconditional purchase obligations. Note that the coe¢ cient on
Op. Leases is 3.46, similar in magnitude to the 3.93 coe¢ cient on B/S Debt, whereas the coe¢ cient on Purchase Obligations is 1.04, substantially smaller than that of B/S Debt.
Tests reported on Panel B of Table 3 show that we cannot reject the hypothesis that the coe¢ cients on Op. Leases and B/S Debt are equal, whereas we can reject the hypothesis that the coe¢ cient on Purchase Obligations is equal to the coe¢ cient on Op. Leases. Table 2 , the di¤erence between the coe¢ cients on Op. Leases and Purchase Obligations is statistically signi…cant.
In summary, Panel B of Table 2 presents results of formal tests of the equivalence of the price e¤ect of B/S Debt, Op. Leases, and Purchase Obligations. These tests reject our null hypothesis (H3) that the relative price e¤ects of balance sheet debt, noncancellable operating lease obligations and unconditional purchase obligations are equal. 
Robustness checks
In this section we describe results of several additional tests to attest to the robustness of our baseline results. First, we examine whether there is any apparent time variation in the relative price e¤ects of balance sheet debt, operating leases, and purchase obligations.
Next, we examine whether our results are sensitive to alternative samples, speci…cations, and statistical methods. Table 3 . Note that there is no discernible time trend in the overall relations among the coe¢ cients. Therefore, the visual evidence in Figure 1 indicates that the relative price-e¤ect of balance sheet debt, operating leases, and purchase obligations does not appear to vary over our sample period. There are two potential explanations for the smaller gap between the credit spread e¤ect of leases and purchase obligations among speculative grade …rms compared to investment grade ones. First, it is likely that speculative grade …rms, being distressed, face greater di¢ culty in …nding counterparties for purchase obligations because vendors are reluctant to 1 3 Table 2 shows that, in the entire sample, the averages of Op. Leases and Purchase Obligations are respectively 0.038 and 0.060. Among investment grade …rms only (2305 observations), the averages are respectively 0.034 and 0.060. Among speculative grade …rms only (541 observations), the averages are respectively 0.052 and 0.059. write purchase contracts with a potentially bankrupt …rm. As a result, it is likely that these …rms do not enter into new purchase obligation contracts with providers of non-essential goods and services, and as result their purchase obligations are, on average, more essential. This is consistent with our manually coded classi…cation of essentiality. Among speculative grade …rms, the distribution of observations across high, moderate, and low essentiality is respectively (24%, 55%, 21%), whereas among speculative grade …rms the distribution is (19%, 57%, 24%). Second, the failure to formally reject Hypothesis 3 is potentially due to reduced statistical power in the smaller speculative grade sample. Indeed, note further that the coe¢ cients on other explanatory variables (e.g., Non-Fixed Assets and Short-term Debt Ratio) are also statistically insigni…cant in the speculative grade sample, while their economic magnitudes remain similar to the full sample case.
Note that results in columns (2) and (3) of Table 4 help us mitigate concerns that our baseline results are driven by reverse causality, i.e., the credit spread e¤ect of purchase obligations is smaller than that of operating leases because distressed …rms have di¢ culty in …nding counterparties for purchase obligations. This reverse causality explanation is inconsistent with the larger gap between the credit spread e¤ects of operating leases and purchase obligations among non-distressed, investment grade …rms.
In column (4) of Table 4 we discount each …rm's noncancellable operating lease obligations and unconditional purchase obligations at the …rm's cost of debt (risk-free rate plus 5-year CDS spread) rather than at the risk-free rate and re-estimate our regression speci…cation. In column (5) we replace asset volatility with equity volatility implied in the prices of 30-day at-the-money calls. Our main tests utilize annualized volatility of the …rm's assets obtained from Moody's KMV, as a proxy for asset volatility; this speci…cation addresses potential concerns related to using data from a commercial vendor. In column (6) we include the CEO Shareholding variable, an additional strategic variable identi…ed by Davydenko and Strebulaev (2007) . Since this variable is unavailable for our full sample the regression is estimated over a reduced sample size.
In column (7) of Table 4 we include two additional explanatory variables: current pro…tabil-ity, as measured by the ratio of earnings before interest and taxes (EBIT) to book value of assets, and interest coverage.
14 Under Merton's (1974) framework, the information contained in both variables is subsumed by leverage, which depends on current stock prices.
However, frictions in raising capital in credit markets potentially give rise to defaults due to a "shortage of cash", even when the equity market sees long-term value. We …nd that the coe¢ cients on both pro…tability and interest coverage are negative as expected, however neither is statistically signi…cant at the 5% level. Moreover, our conclusions regarding the relative magnitude of the leverage coe¢ cients are unchanged. In Column (8) we include Industry-E¤ects (i.e., a di¤erent dummy variable for each industry) using the Fama-French 10-industry classi…cation. Our results are robust to each of these modi…cations: the coe¢ -cient on operating lease obligations and purchase obligations are statistically signi…cant, with the coe¢ cient on operating leases being higher than the coe¢ cient on purchase obligations.
Further, tests of Hypothesis 3 (untabulated) for each of these speci…cations also con…rm results from the main analysis that the relative price e¤ect of noncancellable operating lease obligations is greater than that of unconditional purchase obligations.
We also explore an alternative empirical estimation method to ensure the robustness of our OLS estimates. In Column (9) of Table 4 we estimate the regression model using a Median regression procedure with the same sample and variables as used in Column (3) of Table   3 . The reported standard errors are obtained by bootstrapping 10,000 times with clustering at the …rm level. Finally, in Column (10) we use standard errors clustered by quarter and by …rm separately. This in an important robustness check, as recent research by Gow, Ormazabal, and Taylor (2010) shows that numerous results in the credit spread valuation literature are not robust to double clustering. In both Column (9) and Column (10) our conclusions remain the same: noncancellable operating lease obligations and unconditional purchase obligations are both statistically signi…cant determinants of credit spreads, but the price e¤ect of operating leases is greater than that of unconditional purchase obligations.
Essentiality conjecture
We conjecture that the di¤erential e¤ect of operating leases and purchase obligations on 1 4 Interest coverage is de…ned as interest expense divided by EBIT, winsorized at 1% in both tails.
credit spreads stems from the di¤erential (average) essentiality of the assets and goods and services underlying the two types of obligations. To further examine this conjecture, we manually classify 10-K disclosed purchase obligations based on how essential the underlying goods and services are for the functioning of the bankrupt …rm as a going concern. The dummy variable Essential is 1 when the degree of essentiality is high and the dummy variable Non-Essential is 1 when the degree is low. Both variables are zero if the degree of essentiality is moderate, or when there is no information about the nature of purchase obligations. We interact Essential and Non-Essential with Purchase Obligations and report regression results in Table 5 . Our Essential and Non-Essential interaction e¤ects not only provide evidence supporting our conjecture that the di¤erential price e¤ect of leases and purchase obligations stems from di¤erences in the average degree of essentiality, but further mitigates concerns that our results are driven by plausible alternative explanations such as risk-change e¤ects or information e¤ects of di¤erent types of obligations. As we previously discussed, our framework includes Asset Volatility, which serves as a control for the potential risk-changing e¤ects associated with executory contracts; thus, to the extent that Asset Volatility is a good control, our main results are not explained by potential di¤erences on the risk-reducing (hedging) or risk-increasing e¤ects purchase obligations vis-a-vis operating leases. Nonetheless, even if
Asset Volatility does not adequately control for risk, our essentiality interactions indicate that risk-changing e¤ects do not provide a satisfactory explanation of our results. This is because there is no a priori reason to believe that purchase obligations associated with essential goods and services would be less risk-reducing than purchase obligations associated with non-essential goods and services.
Similarly, we argue earlier that our framework accounts for any information that purchase obligations or leases may have about future business prospects, as such information would reduce leverage today through its impact on current stock prices. However, information e¤ects are potentially still an alternative explanation for a di¤erential price impact if (i) leases, as opposed to purchase obligations, do not provide good information, and (ii) CDS markets incorporate information that is not yet impounded in equity prices. Nonetheless, our essentiality interactions indicate that information e¤ects do not provide a satisfactory explanation for our results since there is no a priori reason to believe that purchase obligations associated with essential goods and services signal "less relevant" information about …rm prospects than purchase obligations associated with non-essential goods and services.
Therefore, it is unlikely that our results are driven by any potential "good" signal that purchase obligations (but not leases) reveal to the CDS market.
Conclusion
We examine how two types of executory contracts, noncancellable operating leases and unconditional purchase obligations, a¤ect CDS spreads. We …nd that credit spreads are positively associated with both leases and purchase obligations. However, per unit of leverage, the credit spread e¤ect of operating leases is substantially larger than that of purchase obligations, even though both types of corporate obligations receive similar treatment in the Bankruptcy Code and current …nancial reporting rules, and are measured by us in a similar way.
We conjecture that the larger credit price e¤ect of operating leases vis-à-vis purchase obligations stems ultimately from the credit market's perception that, on average, leased assets are more essential for the functioning of a bankrupt …rm than are purchase obligations of goods and services. If so, compared to purchase obligations, leases are more likely to be assumed rather than rejected by bankruptcy trustees, regardless of the original terms of the contracts.
Since assumed and rejected executory contracts are, respectively, e¤ectively senior and e¤ec-tively junior to unsecured debt, leases are, as compared to purchase obligations, associated with larger losses given default for holders of unsecured debt.
We provide further evidence consistent with our conjecture. We examine individual …rms'
10-K descriptions of their purchase obligations, and classify …rms into three groups depending on the degree to which their underlying goods and services are essential for the functioning of a bankrupt …rm as a going concern. We …nd that the credit spread e¤ect per unit of purchase obligation leverage is economically equivalent to the e¤ect of leases when the degree of essentiality of purchase obligations is high, and equal to zero when their degree of essentiality is low.
Our results potentially inform the current debate on whether or to what extent a …rm's executory contracts should be recognized on its balance sheet, a question also posed by Barth (2006, 122) . In particular, our results are pertinent to the proposed leasing standard that would require …rms to recognize substantially all leasing obligations and related assets on the balance sheet for leases over one year, whereas purchase obligations would remain Where a plan document does exist, we obtain information from bankruptcy …lings. 17 In some cases, particularly those that are currently in Chapter 11 (e.g. Kodak, case 5), we obtain information about assumption and rejection primarily from "…rst day motions."
Debtor's counsel typically seeks a number of orders in the …rst days of the case in an e¤ort to minimize the disruption caused by chapter 11. Certain of these "…rst-day orders," as they Motions requesting authority to reject or assume unexpired leases and executory contracts typically include the following as bases:
The Bankruptcy Code provides that a debtor in possession may "reject any executory contract or unexpired lease of the debtor"subject to court approval (11 U.S.C. § 365(a).)
The provision for rejecting an executory contract "allows a trustee to relieve the bank- Leases. 18 In the week following the initial …ling, Reddy …led a motion to assume a master lease for equipment used in its ice manufacturing lines (e.g., pelletizing and shrink-wrapping equipment) and for self-contained machines at third-party locations that produce, package, and store ice. Among the bases for relief, the motion stated: "The Debtors wish to assume the Master Equipment Lease Agreement because the Leased Equipment is essential to the Debtors' e¤orts to successfully restructure. The Leased Equipment, which is utilized in more than eighty (80) third party locations as well as several Debtor-operated facilities, signi…cantly reduces the manufacturing, distribution and delivery costs associated with the Debtors'products and is integral to the Debtors'operations."Also following the initial …ling,
Reddy …led a motion to assume leases for trailers (i.e., vehicles used to deliver ice.) The motion pertained to existing trailers already being leased, trailers for which Reddy and the lessor had made a prepetition agreement for their manufacture and subsequent lease, and additional trailers which Reddy required for its seasonal needs (as 60% to 70 percent of Reddy's pro…ts result from seasonal demand.) In this motion, Reddy states that the trailer lessor company "constitutes a critical vendor."
Critical Vendors. 19 Reddy's …rst day motion for authorization to pay prepetition claims of critical suppliers notes that it "[does] business with many of the Critical Vendors without the bene…t of contracts and, therefore, these Critical Vendors generally are not obligated to do business with the Debtors or to honor particular trade terms in the future. As such, 1 8 Retrieved from: http://www.kccllc.net/documents/1232349/1232349120418000000000004.pdf http://www.kccllc.net/documents/1232349/1232349120427000000000015.pdf 1 9 Retrieved from: http://www.kccllc.net/documents/1232349/1232349120412000000000020.pdf failure to pay the Critical Vendor Claims would likely result in a disruption or cancellation of deliveries of goods and services and thus, undermine the Debtors' operations." 20 The motion states in a footnote that Critical Vendors with which Reddy has a service or supply agreement would remain obligated to perform the agreement, but there would nevertheless be a need to "litigate with their Critical Vendors to compel them to perform under their contracts should they refuse to provide goods and services consistent to (sic) the terms of any contract with the Debtors."
Other Executory Contracts. Non-residential Real Property Leases. 22 At the …ling date, all 642 stores possessed by the Debtors were nonresidential real property leases. In First Day Motions, the debtors …led a motion to reject four of these leases. Further, the properties had already been vacated, so the rejection of the unexpired lease would be retroactive to the date when the properties was vacated. The motion states: "Because the Debtors' no longer maintain operational retail stores at the Leased Premises, continued compliance with the terms of the Leases would be burdensome and would provide no corresponding bene…t to the Debtors or the stakeholders in these chapter 11 cases." The motion goes on to state: "The Debtors have also reviewed 2 0 Criteria used to identify critical vendors include: "(a) whether the vendor in question is a "sole-source"or "limited source" provider, (b) the costs and delay associated with identifying and qualifying a replacement, (c) whether the Debtors receive advantageous pricing or other terms from a Vendor such that replacing the Vendor postpetition would result in signi…cantly higher costs to the Debtors, and (d) the overall impairment on the Debtors' operations that would result if the particular Critical Vendor ceased or delayed services or shipments." Non-residential Real Property Leases. 25 On various dates during the six months after …ling for Chapter 11, the Debtors rejected leases relating to approximately 70 locations because they were identi…ed as "underperforming and burdensome to the estate."Six months after …ling, the Debtors assumed approximately 330 unexpired leases, which "constituted the bulk of the Debtors'operating locations."
Critical Vendors. 26 The …rst day motions included a motion to pay the prepetition claims of 10 critical vendors, including providers of waste management services, supplies such as nutritional supplements and beverages for retail sale, and TV service and atmospheric music at the Debtors'…tness clubs (the loss of which, it was argued, would "give Club Members the impression that the quality of the Debtors'clubs was declining and that the Debtors were spiraling towards liquidation rather than reorganization.") The motion speci…cally states that it should not be construed as a "request for authority to assume any executory contract or unexpired lease"under section 365.
Other Executory Contracts. Aircraft Leases. 29 As of the …ling date, the Debtor had two Aircraft Leases. The First Day Motions included a motion to reject both leases.
Critical Vendors. 30 As of the …ling date, the Debtors estimated that they had approximately 2,000 vendors with outstanding prepetition claims in the aggregate amount of ap- Critical Vendors up to an aggregate cap of $40 million where such payment is necessary to ensure supply on a postpetition basis.
31 3 1 Critical Vendors were de…ned as "suppliers and service providers that: (a) provide unique goods or services that are otherwise unavailable or (b) provide goods or services that the Debtors are unable to procure without incurring signi…cant migration costs or compromising quality." Arguing for the importance of Critical Vendors the Motion stated: "Given the specialized type of goods and the complexity of services required to maintain the Debtors' operations, the Debtors …rmly believe that certain Critical Vendors could not be replaced within a reasonable time or on terms as bene…cial to the Debtors as those already in place. Moreover, if a Critical Vendor were to refuse to do business with the Debtors, the resulting disruption in supply of raw materials, components and …nished goods would ripple through the Debtors'businesses, idling production of certain product lines and the ability to service existing products or, in some cases, entire production facilities, and damaging the Debtors' ability to create …nal products or to deliver goods to customers (and, therefore, maintain customer relationships and generate revenue), all to the detriment of the Debtors'estates and their creditors. Further, given that many product lines are managed globally with common vendors serving multiple regions, a disruption to the Debtors' operation could have a ripple e¤ect on the Debtors' foreign a¢ liates." The Motion also refers to the "carefully-choreographed, highly-integrated stages of development, production and delivery realized through a synchronization of the numerous third-party suppliers, vendors and service providers within the Debtors'global supply chain network." 
Appendix

High
Brinker International Inc.
A "purchase obligation" is defined as an agreement to purchase goods or services that is enforceable and legally binding on the Company and that specifies all significant terms, including: fixed or minimum quantities to be purchased; fixed, minimum or variable price provisions; and the approximate timing of the transaction. The Company's purchase obligations primarily consist of long-term obligations for the purchase of telecommunication services, certain non-alcoholic beverages and baked goods and exclude agreements that are cancelable without significant penalty.
Chiron Corp. 
Low
Gillette Co.
The amounts indicated in this line primarily reflect future contractual payments under various take-or-pay arrangements or firm commitments entered into as part of the normal course of business. Commitments made under take-or-pay obligations represent future purchases in line with expected usage to obtain favorable pricing. While the amounts listed represent contractual obligations, we do not believe it is likely that the full contractual amount would be paid if the underlying contracts were canceled prior to maturity. In such cases, we generally are able to negotiate new contracts or cancellation penalties, resulting in a reduced payment. The amounts do not include obligations related to other contractual purchase obligations that are not take-or-pay arrangements or firm commitments. Such contractual purchase obligations are primarily purchase orders at fair value that are part of normal operations and are reflected in historical operating cash flow trends. We do not believe such purchase obligations will adversely affect our liquidity position. 
Moderate
Op. Leases
= PV Leases÷ (MV of Equity+ Debt + PV Leases +PV Purchase Obligations).
Purchase Obligations
= PV Purchase Obligations ÷ (MV of Equity+ Debt + PV Leases +PV Purchase Obligations).
Assets ($ millions)
= total book assets. Data source: Compustat.
Non-fixed Assets
= one minus the ratio of net property, plant and equipment to total assets. Data source: Compustat.
Short-term Debt Ratio
= ratio of debt in current liabilities to total debt and preferred stock = ST Debt / Debt Data source: Compustat.
Inst. Ownership
= percentage of total equity owned by institutional shareholders. Essential / Non-Essential = dummy variables. Essential is equal to 1 if purchase-obligations appear to be essential for the functioning of a bankrupt firm as a going concern. Non-Essential is equal to 1 if purchase obligations appear not to be essential. Data source: 10-k, firm websites. 
